October 2024 – Adapt Research Ltd

The Critical Minerals That Matter: Aotearoa/NZ’s Basic Needs in a Global Catastrophe

Matt Boyd, Nick Wilson

TLDR/Summary

The NZ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment released a Draft Critical Minerals List, for public consultation (now closed).
The list is based on a report by Wood MacKenzie which identified a short list of critical minerals.
We find that the list could pay more attention to the minerals essential to NZ in a global catastrophe scenario.
Therefore, we made a submission on the draft list that takes this global catastrophic risk management perspective.
We strongly agree that the following minerals already included should remain on the list: Potassium, Phosphate, Boron, Cobalt, Copper, Magnesium, and Selenium
Given changing needs following a global catastrophe, the list could additionally include Gold, Silver, Iron, Calcium (Limestone), Thermal Coal, Salt (sodium chloride), Iodine, and Geological Hydrogen (and perhaps other minerals).
The global catastrophic risk lens should be applied across all strategic analyses the government undertakes.

Two Tales of the Apocalypse

In the book The Knowledge Lewis Dartnell speculates on how someone might rebuild civilisation from scratch after an apocalypse. The essential minerals he mentions, in rough order of priority, include those needed for agriculture (potassium, nitrogen, and phosphorus for fertiliser), food preservation (salt), thermal energy (coal), lime/calcium carbonate (multipurpose for agriculture, hygiene, safe drinking water, smelting metal, making glass, and construction materials), the pyrite rocks (to make sulphuric acid for chemical production processes), clay and lime mortars plus sand and gravel for cement, and iron for steel.

In The End of the World is Just the Beginning Peter Zeihan examines global demographic trends and geopolitical strife, and warns of future severe disruptions to global trade, and the potential for industrial collapse in many regions. His analysis underscores the importance of access to iron ore, bauxite (aluminium), copper, cobalt, lithium, silver, gold, molybdenum, platinum, and the rare earth elements.

The overarching point of these two books is that industrial processes and the wellbeing and quality of life that depend on them, are in turn dependent on a critical set of key inputs. The critical minerals. Preserving what already exists is clearly easier than rebuilding an industrial society from scratch, so it is wise for societies to ensure continuing access to critical minerals.

Global Catastrophic Risks

Production, trade and supply of critical minerals is threatened by global catastrophic risks such as nuclear war, supervolcano eruptions, extreme pandemics, cyberattacks and solar storms. These all threaten global infrastructure and could precipitate the collapse of production or global trade (see for example our Hazard Profile on nuclear war and NZ).

A core problem for island nations is that many of them, such as Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ) are effectively the ‘last bus stop on the route’ and could suffer immense consequences in these contexts that accelerate the risk of societal collapse. Access to critical minerals is needed to secure basic needs such as clean water (eg, chlorine), food production (NPK fertilisers), and heating (eg, coal for thermal energy in case of electrical failures).

MBIE’s Draft Critical Minerals List

To its credit, the NZ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) recently released a Draft Critical Minerals List for public consultation. MBIE’s justification for creating a critical minerals list centres on ensuring economic stability, supporting technological advancement and clean energy transitions, strengthening international partnerships, and addressing potential supply chain vulnerabilities for minerals essential to NZ’s current and future needs.

The List is extracted from a report by Wood Mackenzie, which also draws on critical mineral lists of other countries. In preparing the report industry stakeholders were consulted and the process included: Definition of Critical Minerals within the NZ context, analysis of NZ mineral production, consumption and trade, data gap analysis, development of a Long List identifying minerals produced by and/or essential to NZ, and a supply risk assessment. The result is the list of minerals in Table 1:

Not Business as Usual

We note that the Wood MacKenzie methodology appears to assume that a degree of global trade continues, as “Global Reserves” and “Global Supply” are key factors in the supply risk assessment. However, there are plausible scenarios where global trade is completely disrupted (see for example our Hazard Profile detailing the impact of a Northern Hemisphere nuclear war on NZ). In such cases even trade with Australia may take some time to re-establish at scale. We feel that the analysis does not yet adequately consider a range of global catastrophic risk scenarios.

The Wood MacKenzie Report defines critical minerals: “to be included in the draft list, a mineral must be:

Essential to NZ’s economy, national security, and technology needs, including renewable energy technologies and components to support our transition to a low emissions future and/or
In demand by NZ’s international partners, and
Susceptible to supply disruptions domestically and internationally.

Essential is defined as critical to maintaining the NZ’s economy today and into the future and not readily substitutable.”

This definition, and the “total mineral demand” calculation performed for the Wood MacKenzie Report, appears to omit minerals that, while not essential under business-as-usual, may attain particular significance in situations where global conditions are radically altered, such as following a global catastrophe that potentially lasts years or a decade or more (eg, nuclear winter).

We are most concerned about the class of risks that would cause the most harm to NZ (including a risk of permanent economic and social damage). To reiterate, these global catastrophic risks (GCRs) include: major volcanic eruptions at global pinch points, nuclear war (with or without nuclear winter or high-altitude electromagnetic pulse), severe pandemics (natural or engineered), major global food shock, global industry disabling solar storms, devastating global cyber-attack, catastrophe from misaligned artificial intelligence (AI), large asteroid/comet impact, etc.

Such risks have the greatest expected harm (when likelihood and impact are multiplied). We have written a detailed report about this kind of risk and how NZ might ensure resilience. Although individually such risks may have a low probability of occurring in any given year, collectively they are plausible, and some are even likely in the long term.

Critical Minerals for Basic Needs

Following a global catastrophe, it will be necessary to focus on ensuring that basic needs (water, food, shelter, energy, communications, transport) are able to be supplied and distributed.

In catastrophe circumstances minerals such as Potassium and Phosphate (which are not on our international partners’ Critical Mineral Lists) may be particularly important, as might Gold, Silver, Coal, Iron, Calcium/Lime. NZ’s critical minerals analysis needs to include a global catastrophic risk lens and contemplate the downstream context following the potential extreme catastrophes listed above.

The particulars of which minerals are “In demand by NZ’s international partners” should include analysis of scenarios where global trade has collapsed and trade operates on a restricted regional basis (eg, NZ, Australia, Indonesia), as this context may alter what is “in demand” regionally.

We made a submission to MBIE about the Draft Critical Minerals List. Our main point in making the submission was that decisions around critical minerals must be taken through a lens that includes global catastrophic risks where international trade is radically altered. There could be a completely new context, and therefore new priorities could emerge (ie, where global reserves and global supply are inaccessible).

This perspective should supplement considerations of mineral needs under business-as-usual for economy, trade, sustainability, and general security considerations.

Through the global catastrophe lens we strongly agreed with the following minerals already included on the Draft List: Potassium, Phosphate, Boron, Cobalt, Copper, Magnesium, and Selenium.

But we also recommended that the following be added to the list: Gold, Silver, Iron, Calcium (Limestone), Thermal Coal, Salt (sodium chloride), Iodine, and Geological Hydrogen.

Our reasoning was as follows:

Potassium and Phosphate: Critical for industrial agriculture and food security.
Boron, Cobalt, Copper, Magnesium, and Selenium: Essential for addressing soil deficiencies in NZ and for alloyed steel production.
Limestone/Calcium and Aggregate/Sand: Crucial for construction and road repairs, especially important due to NZ’s extreme dependence on road transport.
Iron (and Bauxite): Vital for tool-making and construction. Domestic production capability important in case of trade disruptions.
Thermal Coal: For heating, and potential energy source if hydroelectric generation is impaired due to climate disruptions (eg, nuclear winter or volcanic winter).
Salt (sodium chloride): Essential for food preservation without refrigeration and chlorine for water treatment.
Gold (and/or Silver): Potentially needed to base a new currency in case of economic collapse, or for purchasing critical imports from Australia and Indonesia.
Iodine: Important for preventing dietary deficiencies and producing disinfectants.
Minerals used as Catalysts for Biofuel Production: Critical for producing biofuels to run agricultural machinery, interisland ships, and other transport in post-disaster scenarios.
Geological Hydrogen Gas: Potential future fuel source in case of disruptions to liquid fuel imports

We are concerned that much risk mitigation activity in NZ addresses only smaller more common risks (eg, floods, earthquakes, 10% global fuel supply disruptions) and therefore leaves most of the expected future harm to New Zealanders unaddressed. In contrast we note that the US has a Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act (2022) and the first US report on how to supply ‘basic needs’ in such scenarios is imminent.

Interdependent Sectors

Finally, we note critical links between minerals, agriculture, transport, interisland shipping, liquid fuel and other industries. For example, agriculture depends on mineral inputs, which must be transported, perhaps between islands, using liquid fuel. These issues of resilience to global catastrophe cannot be addressed in isolation, and the global catastrophic risk lens should be applied across the spectrum of resilience initiatives, such as NZ’s National Fuel Security Study, solution scoping for the interisland ferry replacements, when considering coastal shipping, transport infrastructure decisions, crop choices and development and land use strategies.

Lost at Sea: Shipping in NZ through a Catastrophic Risk Lens

By Matt Boyd, Mike Hodgkinson, Nick Wilson

**Listing to Port:** Is this the marketplace for interisland ships NZ has been browsing? (Image credit: ChatGPT)

TLDR/Summary

NZ’s interisland and coastal shipping infrastructure is inadequate for global catastrophe scenarios that limit international shipping or liquid fuel supply to NZ.
The recent history of failures including ferries and coastal ships highlights the vulnerability of interisland connections to any loss of component supply or international expertise.
NZ heavily relies on road trucking (93%), which is fuel-inefficient and vulnerable to disrupted fuel supply or road damage.
Coastal shipping capacity is low, limiting transport options.
Key resilience options to protect against global catastrophic risks: Upgrade and diversify the interisland ferry fleet; Expand and modernise coastal shipping capabilities; Develop local biofuel production for shipping; Accelerate transport electrification; Improve rail infrastructure, including interisland rail capacity; Create redundancy in transport systems.
Benefits include: improved catastrophe resilience, reduced emissions, better preparedness for various disasters.

Introduction

Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ) is supposedly a seafaring nation, but in case of a global catastrophe our interisland and coastal shipping infrastructure is far from being up to scratch.

Global catastrophic risks such as nuclear war, supervolcano eruptions, extreme pandemics, cyberattacks and solar storms threaten global infrastructure and could precipitate the collapse of global trade (see for example our Hazard Profile on nuclear war and NZ). NZ is the ‘last bus stop on the route’ and could suffer immense consequences that accelerate the risk of societal collapse.

NZ’s transport infrastructure is extremely dependent on imported liquid fuel supplies, but also imported components for maintenance and repair. In the case of an extended period of trade isolation, the country may struggle to fuel and repair transport assets such as ships.

This is particularly concerning given NZ’s recent track record of shipping maintenance woes, poor liquid fuel security status, and NZ’s extreme dependence on road trucking for transport.

NZ needs to upgrade its shipping infrastructure and secure a minimum locally produced shipping fuel supply as a national public priority. This is to ensure food and essential commodities can be distributed around the country even in a severe global catastrophe.

For resilience, NZ would ideally use a balanced mix of transport options such as efficient locally controlled coastal shipping, electric rail, road trucking, and trans-Tasman shipping options that don’t depend on global shipping routes. However, at present NZ is 93% dependent on the least fuel-efficient option of road trucking (which can consume double the fuel per container moved than rail or shipping).

Road trucking in turn is dependent on functioning and resilient Cook Strait ferries. But these ferries have a track record of failures in recent times, and in a global catastrophe, it may not be possible to conduct repairs that depend on imported parts and international expertise.

To avoid isolating the North from South Island, the interisland ferry fleet needs to be diverse, modern, well-maintained, have high capacity and redundancy. It also needs a secure fuel supply that doesn’t depend completely on imported liquid fuels.

The Problem

The history of interisland ferry failures is worrying (see supporting links after this blog):

In 1999 the Aratere suffered power failures shortly after entering service.
In 2005, the Arahura experienced a major loss of propulsion power approaching Tory channel due to failure of a diesel generator.
In 2006, the Aratere developed a significant list due to shifting cargo in heavy weather, causing minor injuries.
In 2013, the Aratere was taken out of service after a fatigue fracture caused it to lose a propeller while crossing Cook Strait.
In 2021, the Kaiārahi experienced a major gear box failure during a Cook Strait crossing.
Throughout 2021 and 2022, there were sporadic cancellations across both Interislander and Bluebridge services due to various mechanical issues.
In 2023 the Kaiārahi and Connemara both faced “engineering issues” in February causing widespread cancellations.
In 2023, the Kaitaki lost all power due to a cooling system leak, drifting dangerously close to Wellington’s south coast, with Wellington hospital going on alert for potential mass casualties.
In 2023, the Kaitaki was out of service again with a gear box problem that required overseas experts to be flown in.
In 2024 the Aratere ran aground in the Marlborough Sounds after a steering failure.
In 2024 the Connemara lost power and started drifting in Cook Strait.
In 2024 the Strait Feronia lost power coming into Wellington Harbour.
There have also been multiple incidents of ferries colliding with wharves or other vessels.

These issues have resulted in frequent cancellations, delays, and stranded passengers, vehicles and freight. Plans to replace the aging ferries in the Interislander fleet with new hybrid-electric ferries failed to materialise and now the government has scrapped a planned upgrade to new vessels.

In response, KiwiRail announced increased ferry maintenance and scheduled longer periods in dry docks for serious maintenance work. Also, international experts were consulted to assess the ships’ conditions and provide recommendations. KiwiRail has considered alternative options, including extending the life of existing ferries, leasing or buying second-hand ferries, and exploring new ferry designs with reduced landside requirements. Though none of these is a comprehensive and long-term resilience solution.

KiwiRail did report 97% ship availability and 85% on-time performance in February 2024, but as noted above, a single mechanical failure, or inability to access fuel could be disastrous for NZ’s connectedness in a global catastrophe. Redundancy and the ability to troubleshoot locally are critical.

Importantly, the problems are not limited to interisland shipping. It is recognised that NZ has low coastal shipping capacity and efforts to improve coastal shipping services have also met with failures. For example, a ‘she’ll be right’ NZ attitude to fitting out a beleaguered coastal barge ended in disaster this year as it ran aground near Westport immediately after being put to service.

We note Waka Kotahi’s Freight and Supply Chain Strategy. There is a 3-year plan to analyse port connections, and a plan across 30 years to strengthen parts of the freight and supply chain system that are critical to national interest, but global catastrophe could strike at any moment. We applaud the goal of more freight being transported by rail and coastal shipping rather than road, but there is yet little evidence of sweeping improvements in resilience.

**Future NZ Shipping?** (Image credit: Midjourney)

Catastrophe Resilient Solutions

In 2023 we produced a report on increasing NZ’s resilience to global catastrophe. In the chapter on transport, we provided resilience options including the need to:

Accelerate electrification, including electric road and rail transport, short haul coastal shipping, and interisland air travel.
Invest in research and development of the optimal methods for producing transport fuel locally in NZ, for example biofuel feedstocks such as canola, and developing food oil factories that can convert to biodiesel production.
Explore how coastal shipping might employ wind assist technology to conserve fuel, be capable of running on biofuels, and quantify the minimum liquid fuel needs for shipping to move the most essential goods (eg, food) around NZ.
Develop principles of land transport and shipping fuel rationing based on prioritisation of population basic needs in a global catastrophe.
Collaborate with Australia on global catastrophe resilience to ensure that trans-Tasman trade can continue using just assets controlled by NZ and Australia.

Interisland Ferry Resilience and Redundancy

NZ needs reliable and resilient interisland shipping options, that are flexible enough to move people, freight, trucks and rail assets, and modern and reliable enough that the risk of irreparable breakdown is extremely low. There needs to be capacity and redundancy in the system.

There are concerns that any Cook Strait ferry solution will not be rail capable. Ideally interisland ferry solutions would accommodate future emphasis on electric rail. If the North and South islands are disconnected, NZ risks a less resilient rail system (as rail assets or repair workshops may be stranded on one island or the other).

Rail, especially electric rail, may be particularly important in a global catastrophe if fuel and transport options are scarce, as it allows intensive near-urban agriculture to follow a railway, as we have argued in our research paper on near urban agriculture for resilience.

Coastal Shipping Assets and Infrastructure

At present it is more cost-effective to ship Australian wheat to processing in Auckland than bring wheat from the South Island, but we cannot assume that trans-Tasman transport will be operational following a global catastrophe. Reliable and sufficient NZ bulk, liquid, and container coastal shipping assets are strategically important.

NZ needs an expanded, capable, flexible and reliable coastal shipping fleet, and associated port infrastructure, perhaps including roll-on, roll-off capability for trucks and rail at a range of ports. This would provide transport resilience, reduced emissions and fuel efficiencies. Yet there are doubts about NZ’s coastal shipping capability and capacity and a lot of ‘coastal’ transport in NZ depends on vessels plying global routes.

Liquid Fuel Supply for Shipping

Shipping is more fuel efficient than road transport in most cases and can be markedly so when a full load of containers is transported. However, shipping still requires a significant amount of liquid fuel.

We’ve previously calculated that as little as 5–15 million litres of locally produced biofuel could power agricultural equipment sufficient to produce food for the entire NZ population (if efficient crops such as wheat are grown near processing and consumption sites – with many more litres needed for producing food such as dairy products).

In contrast the annual fuel consumption of a single ship to distribute food is in the order of 10 million litres. Such a ship (eg, like the MV Moana Chief) can ply coastal routes and is trans-Tasman capable. Some ships can run on 100% biodiesel (B100), but regulatory changes and certifications would be needed to permit this. We estimate that local production would require at least 8,000 hectares of canola crop or some other biofuel feedstock for every 10 million litres of biodiesel. Such considerations need to be part of a comprehensive mixed transport resilience plan and essential quantities compiled in an improved National Fuel Plan.

These liquid fuel volumes need to be put in the context of the amount of biodiesel that previously operating refineries could produce. One refinery in NZ is capable of producing in the order of 10–20 million litres of biodiesel per annum, however it has now switched to producing food oil.

We commend a new agreement for a biofuel refinery at Marsden Point, but from a diversification and resilience perspective NZ needs to produce a wide range of fuels (for aviation, shipping, agricultural machinery etc) and the problem of interisland transportation of this fuel remains. Biofuel refineries would ideally be in both North and South islands, at least until more widespread electrification of agriculture and road transport occurs.

One concrete possibility is to begin by pursuing the potentially low hanging fruit of marine fuel. Canola feedstock in Canterbury with the potential for wheat rotation crops (to expand production), could supply the Rolleston PureOil NZ refinery which could produce marine fuel with linkage to Lyttleton for a single NZ marine bunker. Multiple refining and bunker nodes would be ideal, and additional opportunities should be sought.

Infrastructure Commission Proposals

The NZ Infrastructure Commission is calling for submissions to its Infrastructure Priorities Programme (first round due 20 December 2024). Submissions can include ‘Stage 1’ proposals that detail major problems (of national significance) that NZ faces. We contest that resilient coastal and interisland shipping is one such priority issue and we encourage people to submit proposals for infrastructure that will enhance the resilience of NZ’s interisland and coastal shipping in the face of potential global catastrophe. Solutions might include interisland or coastal vessels, landside infrastructure, trans-Tasman trade options, and solutions for a resilient shipping fuel supply.

The country cannot assume that help, expertise and components from overseas will be easily available when needed after a global catastrophe. Distribution of food, fuel, and medicines depends on a resilient local transport system. Indeed, all industrial systems are interdependent and without reliable shipping every sector would break down in a multi-island nation. There is potential for widespread societal harms in a catastrophe that accrue well beyond the accounting in shipping industry risk processes. The right resilience incentives are lacking and this means there may be a case for government ownership of some strategically critical shipping assets.

Finally, the suggestions above would likely help provide a range of immediate benefits to the country. These include reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increase transport security, and providing resilience to a wider class of natural hazards such as extreme weather or earthquakes.

Further recent media about NZ shipping problems and solutions

[1] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/502312/timeline-the-troubled-cook-strait-ferries

[2] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/528514/timeline-a-recent-history-of-cook-strait-ferry-woes

[3] https://www.1news.co.nz/2024/06/22/grounded-interislander-ferrys-25-years-of-troubled-history/

[4] https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/cook-strait-rail-ferries/strikes-and-strandings

[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interislander

[6] https://www.interislander.co.nz/explore/the-history-of-the-interislander-ferry

[7] https://www.thepost.co.nz/nz-news/350319712/troubled-waters-brief-history-interislander-issues

[8] https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/project-irex-4914527.pdf

[9] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/511300/more-frequent-checks-for-kiwirail-s-ageing-ferry-fleet

[10] https://www.munz.org.nz/2024/09/20/connemara-failure-highlights-urgent-need-to-address-ferry-fiasco/

[11] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/528525/bluebridge-ferry-maritime-union-sounds-alarm-about-health-and-safety

NZ needs to audit shipping capabilities through a global catastrophe lens (Image credit: Midjourney)

Lessons from the Cambridge Conference on Catastrophic Risk 2024

Video: Dr Matt Boyd presents highlights of NZ’s vulnerability and resilience to nuclear war and other global catastrophes. You can download a PDF version of this presentation to access all links.

Blog Summary/TLDR

Diverse researchers, analysts, and officials gathered at the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) in September 2024 to discuss global catastrophic risks and potential solutions.
Key topics included: emerging risks, the systemic nature of risk, resilience options, comprehensive risk governance, and partnerships for change.
The conference highlighted the expanding and interdependent nature of global risks, the challenges in managing them, and the need for better international cooperation and coordination in risk assessment and governance.
Practical solutions included: inclusion of global risks in national risk assessments, new international agreements, national chief risk officers, and on-the-ground solutions to the local manifestations of catastrophe.
New Zealand needs to improve its preparedness for global catastrophe and consider measures such as ensuring local fuel supply, upgrading critical infrastructure, and developing a publicly facing National Risk Register that includes global catastrophic risks.
Click the YouTube video above to watch Dr Matt Boyd’s conference presentation.
For more on these issues, you can read the NZCat Main Report about NZ’s vulnerability and resilience to nuclear war or visit Islands for the Future of Humanity.

The CSER Conference

On the 17–18^th Sept 2024 I joined a diverse set of researchers and analysts converging on the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) to contemplate risks that could result in the collapse of civilisation.

Alongside catastrophic risk researchers and analysts from the global North and South, attendees included diplomats, representatives from the UN, think tanks, governments such as Singapore, NATO advisors, and students.

Tongue-in-cheek dinner speaker Lance Gharavi professed the merits of the comical Centre for Applied Eschatology, however most in attendance had the goal of preventing global catastrophes such as nuclear war, extreme pandemics or technological disasters, and ensuring recovery should these catastrophes ever befall us.

Keynote speaker Mami Mizutori, a former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, talked about four needs in the face of potential global catastrophe:

Comprehensive risk governance
Partnerships for change
Better synergy among global agendas
Courage to tackle systemic risk

But Mizutori also warned that there is a difficult path ahead with multilateralism and binding agreements being difficult to achieve in 2024.

Peter Sogaard Jorgensen spoke about the evolution of the polycrisis we now face, and the structural drivers of risk that have landed the world amid a set of ‘anthropocene traps’. Understanding the evolution of these structural incentives is key to overcoming them.

The conference heard grass-roots solutions to major risks including flood resilience in Pakistan (from Sabuhi Essa), and the importance of indigenous knowledge and rights (Elena Kavanagh). We also heard about ‘derailment risks’ (Laurie Laybourn) where solutions to catastrophes such as climate change could become unattainable as our capability to solve them is undermined by the very catastrophe process itself.

Emerging risks discussed included biological and other converging technological threats (Margaret Kosal), the risk of space wars and satellite disruption (Joanna Rozpedowski), including the blurred lines between what is a military target vs civilian asset.

The audience heard new approaches to risk analysis and mitigation such as ‘impact webs’ (Edward Sparkes) or ‘webs of prevention’ (Catherine Rhodes), as well as the value of a potential UN convention on existential risk (Manfred Kohler).

A session on resilience to global catastrophe highlighted solutions such as fuel security for agriculture in NZ (this author: Matt Boyd), resilient foods (Juan Garcia), and the need for government plans. One success reported by Monica Ulloa of the Observatorio de Riesgos Catastróficos Globales, was the government of Argentina including abrupt sunlight reducing scenarios (such as volcanic or nuclear winter) in government risk analysis. Argentina is the first country to do this.

I had informative and stimulating conversations ranging from the importance of government Chief Risk Officers to coordinate anticipatory risk governance, through to first-hand accounts about wealthy individuals looking to identify resilient locations to build secure refuges.

It’s impossible to give full details of the 50 speakers and dozens of poster presentations here, but the overall picture was one of expanding major global risks (due to rising complexity, interconnectedness and human impacts) some which may be beginning to elude our capacity to manage them, and an international system not up to the task of coordinated risk governance.

But solutions are possible, and takeaways included the urgent need for governments to add global catastrophic risks to risk assessment and risk management processes, and perhaps more critically, to cooperate and coordinate on cross-border risks.

We have recently seen the UN Member States adopt a Pact for the Future, which explicitly calls out global catastrophic and existential risks and addresses climate, nuclear, biological, and technological risks. These ambitious statements must now be backed through action of Member States individually and collectively.

I also had the opportunity to take part in two of Lara Mani’s (CSER) global risk workshops.

The first was a creative workshop focused on practical creation and dissemination of risk information and key messages in succinct and accessible forms.

In the second, I played the role of UK Minister for Health in a scenario-based workshop contemplating firstly an Indonesian supervolcano eruption, the cascading consequences of which spread to affect the entire world, and secondly, a scenario dealing with the catastrophic collapse of the UK power grid.

These exercises in communication and understanding of catastrophic risk were very effective and governments should undertake such exercises regularly.

*Not all risk communication should be dry research reports: Communication workshop facilitated by Lara Mani (CSER) – Author’s photo*

Reflections

On reflection after the conference, I can commend the government of my own country (NZ) for some of its recent initiatives:

National Fuel Security Study – to investigate the options for ensuring liquid fuel supply, however this study needs to contemplate global catastrophic risks explicitly.
Draft Critical Minerals List – for public consultation to inform strategic development of essential mineral resources (see our submission that takes a global catastrophe perspective here).
Draft Resolution on Nuclear War Effects and Scientific Research, announced with Ireland, that proposes an up-to-date international study on the effects of nuclear war (ideally including second order cascading effects).
National Emergency Management Agency ‘CatPlan’ handbook for hazard agnostic catastrophe management – not released yet. It appears this handbook will discuss catastrophes ‘requiring international support’, however some scenarios need to assume such support is not forthcoming.
Given the last point, NZ needs to assess its capital stocks and ensure that the available human, natural, physical, and financial capitals are sufficient to provide resilience options in the radically altered context of a true global catastrophe.

As such, the NZ Government can still learn from global examples:

Argentina’s inclusion of abrupt sunlight reduction scenarios in national risk assessment (ie, nuclear, volcanic, or comet/asteroid winters).
The Singapore Government’s attendance at the Cambridge Conference on Catastrophic Risk as part of its ongoing foresight capabilities.
The United Kingdom and other countries’ publicly facing National Risk Registers.
The United States Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act, which mandated a report on these risks that is due imminently.
The many global catastrophe scenario exercises being undertaken around the world to understand the needed preparation and management for risks such as: extreme pandemics, nuclear war/winter, supervolcano, asteroid/comet impact, catastrophic electrical grid or communications failure, or catastrophic global food shortage.

NZ needs to deploy a systemic approach to vulnerability and resilience using a global catastrophic risk lens. Key vulnerabilities in NZ include single failure points that must be mitigated as a priority. This includes (among other initiatives):

Ensuring local supply and production of liquid fuels (eg, biofuels) for critical processes such as agriculture, should fuel imports cease.
Ensuring reliable and future-proofed Cook Strait ferries, which are currently so critical given NZ remains over-dependent on road truck freight for distribution of food and essential goods.
Upgrading coastal shipping and rail assets and associated infrastructure to facilitate trade, including with Australia, in the context of a dire global catastrophe.
Developing a Digital Communications Continuity Plan.

NZ could develop and leverage a publicly facing National Risk Register connected to a set of solution visions, combined with the Infrastructure Commission’s Infrastructure Priorities Programme to ensure the required resilience is developed. I encourage people to submit Stage 1 proposals to the Commission highlighting key national vulnerabilities.

We have prepared a range of materials the NZ Government and other organisations can use in this mission, and interested readers can visit:

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